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INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND INSIDE
• INFORMATION
CLIFFORD J. ALEXANDER *
Investment companies1 are in business to optimize the interests of
their shareholders; thus the prime responsibility of their managers is
to supervise investment portfolios in a manner calculated to achieve
this goal. Because the persons responsible for investment decisions are
always in the market for corporate information, they may occasionally
find themselves in possession of significant facts regarding an issuer
which are not publicly known. This article discusses the principal
methods in which investment companies have access to such informa-
tion and analyzes the elements which give rise to an affirmative duty
of disclosure before the information may be acted upon.
As shareholders in portfolio companies, most investment com-
panies have consciously chosen an inactive role as the policy best
suited to furthering the interests of their own shareholders.' The
choice is generally influenced by the fact that involvement in portfolio
company affairs can create conflicts of interest and restrict investment
decision-making." Thus investment companies traditionally have care-
fully limited the character of their relationships with portfolio com-
panies. As a result, the number—of reported instances of investment
* A.B., Rockhurst College, 1966; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969;
Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1 Throughout this article the term "investment company" refers to a company which
falls within the definition contained in 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964), as amended, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
The term means, in brief, an issuer engaged in the business of investing or trading in
securities, or one that owns or holds investment securities having a value exceeding 40%
of its total assets. See Ganett, When Is An Investment Company?, 37 U. Det. L.J. 355
(1960); Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment Company: Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment
Company Act, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1959); Kerr and Appelbaum, Inadvertent Investment
Companies—Ten Years After, 25 Bus. Lawyer 887 (1970) for a discussion of the tech-
nical problems involved in identifying investment companies,
For comprehensive discussions of investment companies generally, see A. Stevenson,
Shares in Mutual Investment Funds (1946); H. Bullock, .The Story of Investment
Companies (1959); Investment Company Institute, Management Investment Companies
(1962); Investment Company Institute, The Money Managers (1967).
2 In 1962, the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce reported that, considering
the size of their holdings, open-end investment companies are relatively inactive share-
holders who tend to give uncritical support to, existing management. House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, Prepared for the Securities
and Exchange Commission by Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, H.R. Rep.
No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1962) thereinafter cited as Wharton Report]. The
Wharton Report indicated that this attitude was common among institutional investors.
Id. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of
Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 310-11 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as PPI].
8 Wharton Report, supra note 2, at 26 and 417-20.
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companies participating in proxy fights and tender offers, advising
management on business matters, or bringing suits to redress wrongs
to shareholders is quite small' When an investment company loses
confidence in the management of a portfolio company, it usually liqui-
dates its holdings in the latter, rather than voting its shares for change
in corporate management or policy.
Investment company reluctance to become involved in the man-
agement or policy-making of portfolio companies does not result from
any of the proscriptions of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(1940 Act). The 1940 Act imposes no significant restrictions on ac-
tivities of investment companies unless the portfolio company happens
to be an "affiliated person."' Moreover, the drafters of the 1940 Act
indicated that investment companies should not be discouraged from
participating actively in the affairs of the companies in which they
invested.° In fact, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
4
 Id. at 424-27; PPI, supra note 2, at 308-10.
Investment companies may not invest in companies having any significant broker-
dealer, investment advisory or underwriter operations. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (3) (1970)
and 17 C.F.R. 270.12d-1 (1971). Nor may they acquire more than 10% of the total
outstanding voting stock of any insurance company. Id. § 80a-12(g). Investment com-
panies are also prohibited from purchasing any voting securities of a company if "circular
ownership" or "cross-ownership" exists or will result from such purchase. Id. § 80a-20(c).
No such restrictions are placed on other institutional investors. Institutional Investor
Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 5, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2542-49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study].
The Senate and House Reports on the 1940 Act and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 contain section-by-section summaries. S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ;
H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). For discussions of the 1940 Investment
Company Act by lawyers who represented groups of investment companies at the
Senate and House hearings and who participated actively in the negotiations leading to
the agreement with respect to the legislation and in drafting the 1940 Act in its final form,
see Jaretztld, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 303 (1941);
Motley, Jackson & Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 1134 (1950).
The Senate and House Reports on the Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970, Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 [hereinafter cited as 1970
Amendments Act] contain section-by-section summaries of the 1940 Act's only major
revisions. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1382, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970). See North, History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 Notre
Dame Lawyer 677 (1969) on the history of federal investment company legislation prior
to 1969, and North, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 Notre Dame
Lawyer 712 (1971) for a discussion of the history and substantive provisions of the 1970
Amendments Act.
8 While the SEC, since 1940, has required investment companies to establish and
disclose to investors their policies with respect to involvement in the affairs of portfolio
companies,.it has never suggested restricting involvement. The original SEC bill, S. 3580,
76 Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), contained a § 8(b) (1) (B) which would have required invest-
ment companies to describe in their registration statement
the activities other than investment in which the registrant is engaged and pro-
poses to engage, such as trading, underwriting, acting as investment adviser, and
participating in or influencing the management of companies' outstanding
securities which are held by the registrant.
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(SEC), at the time it drafted the original bills, specifically argued that
investment companies were ideally suited to pursue and protect the
best interests of all small investors, as well as those of their own share-
holders:
Investment companies may serve the useful role of represen-
tatives of the great number of inarticulate and ineffective
individual investors in industrial corporations in which in-
vestment companies are also interested. Throughout the
course of the existence of such industrial corporations, vari-
ous problems are presented to their stockholders which re-
quire a degree of knowledge of financial and management
practices not possessed by the average stockholder. Invest-
ment companies by virtue of their research facilities and
specialized personnel are not only in a position to adequately
appraise these situations but also have the financial means
to make their support or opposition effective. These invest-
ment companies can perform the function of sophisticated
investors, disassociated from the management of their port-
folio companies. They can appraise the activities of the man-
agement critically and expertly, and in that manner not only
serve their own interests but the interest of the other public
stockholders.'
Even diversified investment companies were allowed to become in-
volved with portfolio companies.' Thus the restriction against their
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940). This provision was deleted, without discussion, during the
congressional hearings. Following enactment of the 1940 Act, however, the SEC adopted
Form N-8B-I for use by management investment companies in preparing registration
statements filed under § 8(b). Item 38(a) of Form N-813-I required a description "of the
policy of the registrant with respect to investments in companies for the purpose of
exercising control or management." The item was renumbered 5(d) in 1954 but was left
unchanged. Most investment companies respond to this item by stating that their policy is
not to invest for the purpose of exercising control or management. SEC Institutional
Investor Study, supra note 5, at XXXI. At present the SEC has under consideration pro-
posals which would substantially expand the requirements for statements of policies of
investment companies on their involvement in the affairs•of their portfolio companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 6853 (Dec. I, 1971), [Current] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ¶ 78,432 (1971).
7
 Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Trusts and Invest-
ment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939). The Investment Trust
Study, made pursuant to § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. H 79a et seq. (1970), took about 4 years to complete and involved the
study of 1,272 trusts and companies for the years 1927-35. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at
39 (1940).
8
 Open-end and closed-end management investment companies are divided by the
Investment Company Act into "diversified" and "nondiversified" companies, the latter
being a residual class which includes all companies not included in the first. 15 U.S.C.
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acquiring more than ten percent of the outstanding voting securities of
portfolio companies was not applied to a twenty-five percent "res-
ervoir" of their total assets.°
I. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACCESS
To INFORMATION
While they have avoided direct involvement in portfolio company
affairs, investment companies have, however, exerted their influence
to establish information "pipe lines" with the management of these
portfolio companies. The Wharton Report found that all but a few of
the open-end investment companies studied had engaged in private
personal contacts such as "frequent visits, telephone calls, correspon-
dence and occasional get-togethers at the annual meeting of the port-
folio company or at the offices of the investment company.'° The Re-
port found further that the character and extent of these communica-
tions were directly related to the size of the investment company; the
larger companies reported a greater frequency of field trips and private
meetings for purposes of obtaining information."
Usually, financial analysts12 employed by the investment com-
§ 80a-5(b) (1970). A diversified company must at all times have at least 75% of the
value of its total assets represented by (a) securities limited in respect of any one
issuer to an amount not greater in value than 5% of the value of the total assets of the
diversified company and to not more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of
the issuer, and (b) cash and cash items (including receivables), U.S. Government securities,
and securities of other investment companies. Id. I 80a-5(b)(1).
The restrictions against making purchases that would result in an investment company
having more than 5% of its total assets invested in the securities of one issuer or owning
more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of one issuer were not new with the
1940 Act. The Revenue Act of 1.936, § 48; 49 Stat. 1669, amending the Internal Revenue
Act of 1928, first adopted the tests for the 1936 Act's definition of "mutual investment
company," but applied them to 100% of an investment company's assets. In 1942, the
1936 Revenue Act test was loosened and the restrictions were applied only to 50% of
assets. Revenue Act of 1942, § 170(a), 56 Stat. 878, amending the Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
53 Stat. 1. This provision remains in effect today. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 851(b)(4).
A number of states, however, have incorporated the restrictions into their blue-sky statutes
and regulations; and they continue to apply them to 100% of the assets of any company
making an offering of securities within their states. See, e.g., Ohio Division of Securities
Regulation Cos-1-06 (C)(1)§(j), 2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. if 38,653 at 34,508 (1968).
9 The purpose of the 25% reservoir was "to stimulate the operations of the capital
markets." Hearings on H.R. 10065, Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 105 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 House
Hearings]. "An investment company will not make a substantial investment in a small
company which has no market for its securities and yet have nothing to say about
management." Id.
10 Wharton Report, supra note 2, at 27.
11 Id. at 423-24.
12 For an analysis of the characteristics of the financial analyst, see Norby, Profile of
the Financial Analyst, 24 Financial Analysts J., No. 4 at 11 (July-Aug. 1968). See also
Hayes, Potential for Professional Status, 23 Financial Analysts J., No. 6 at 29 (Nov.-Dec,
1967).
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pany or, if the company is externally managed, its investment adviser,
will conduct the interviews and seek to establish lines of communica-
tion with the management of portfolio companies. Many investment
companies attach considerable importance to impressions they derive
from field visits. 13 The president of one open-end company has stated
that his company's analysts "interview ten different managements, or
hold ten management interviews each working day during the year." 14
In 1967 it was reported that the nine analysts of one investment ad-
viser
travelled] about 450,000 miles a year in aggregate, collect-
ing detailed data and personal insights about literally hun-
dreds of corporations, including every one held in the port-
folio of the [ir] . . . funds, for it is a house policy . . . [of
this investment adviser] never to buy a security of a com-
pany unless that company has been visited first by a financial
analyst.'
Investment companies also obtain information directly from is-
suers, usually in connection with priVate offerings of restricted securi-
ties' made pursuant to Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act)." Investment companies are frequently approached by
issuers because of their large assets and flexible investment policies. 18
More importantly, investment companies are generally safe offer-
ees under the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina,
which held that the private offering exemption is unavailable unless
every offeree is a sophisticated investor who does not "need . . . the
protection afforded by [the] registration" of securities under the 1933
Act." Since transactions exempt from the registration requirements
are not exempt from any of the fraud provisions of the federal securi-
is
	 supra note 2, at 85-86.
14 University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, Mutual
Funds as Investors of Large Pools of Money, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 723 (1967).
is Investment Company Institute, The Money Managers 85-86 (1967). This book,
which was authored by the national association of the mutual fund industry, contains an
excellent description of the structure and operation of a large investment advisory firm
and a field visit by one of its financial analysts. Id. at 73-86.
18 Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964), defines the
term "restricted securities" to mean "securities, acquired directly or indirectly from the
issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions
not involving any public offering." Securities Act Release No. .5223 (Jan. 11, 1972),
[Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 78,847. See note 29 infra.
17 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970): "The provisions of section 77c of this title shall not
apply to . . . (2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
18 See Investment Company Act Release No.'5847 (Oct. 21, 1969), 4 CCH Fed. See.
L. Rep. § 72,135.
19 SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
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ties laws," an issuer must furnish investment companies which purchase
restricted securities with all material information." In addition, the
Supreme Court stated in Ralston Purina that the test for the avail-
ability of the private offering exemption is whether the offerees are in
such a position with respect to the issuer as to have "access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose." 22 Consequently,
issuers of privately placed securities often give investment companies
with restricted securities holdings information not generally available
to the public before and after the private sale."
Information of the type obtained through contacts with officers
of portfolio companies is also indirectly provided through brokerage
firms." In addition to their own analysts, brokerage firms have access
to information through avenues not open to investment companies."
News and other impressions can be carried to the institutional sales-
men by way of the firm's syndicate department or by a principal or
associate in the firm who happens to be an officer or director of a
portfolio company." In general, the same supplemental research and
advisory materials furnished by brokerage firms to investment com-
panies are furnished to their other customers. 2" However, it is axiomatic
20
 Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, g (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 9, 10, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, j, r (1970).
21 See The Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. II 76,539; Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972) [Current] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 76,539 (1972).
22
 346 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added).
23 For example, purchase agreements relating to restricted debt securities frequently
require the issuer to provide the owners of the restricted securities with interim un-
audited financial statements.
24 PPI, supra note 2, at 85, 163-64.
2G The depth of research on which brokerage firms base their investment advice
varies considerably from firm to firm. SEC, Report of the Special Study of the Securities
Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 344-58 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Special Study].
26 Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 77,832, Hearing Examiner's initial decision affirmed by the Commission, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163 (1971). Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 77, 656 (1969) ; Blyth & Co., [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, 11 77,647 (1969) ; Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) ; Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct.
App. 1968).
26a See Welles, How the Street is Putting the Little Man Out of the Market, Inst.
Inv. 37 (March, 1972). The author quotes the director of investment policy for a major
brokerage firm as stating that the firm's salesmen are " 'reprimanded' . • if they dissem-
inate certain research information toe widely among small investors. 'Giving it to everyone
downgrades the quality of the work, . . . It cheapens it.' " Id. at 92-93.
In its recent policy statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 4
CCU Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 74,811 (February 2, 1972) the SEC indicated that such a
practice may be improper:
We believe that a broker is obliged to communicate any material changes in his
prior investment advice arising from subsequent research he may do to all cus-
tomers whom he knows have purchased and may be bolding shares on the basis of
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that investment companies and other institutional investors receive
more and better services; for it is a fact of life that useful information
is a valuable piece of property that is first passed around to those able
to pay the most for it."
Although direct contacts continue to be a useful investment tool
because of the first-hand impressions of management they provide,
access to corporate management is important today for another reason.
Primarily as a result of specific recommendations contained in the
Wheat Report,28
 the reporting requirements for issuers have been
greatly expanded and incentives have been established to encourage
reporting of information by companies not otherwise required to do
so.29
 As more detailed and sophisticated data is reported by issuers,
his earlier advice, at least under circumstances where to do so would not impose
an unreasonable hardship on the broker.
Id. at 65,620. Characterizing the Commission's statement as "the bare minimum standard
in this area," one Commissioner has said that "we feel a prompt and fair dissemination to
large and small investors alike is indispensable to the efficiency of the securities market."
The Public: We Need Them, Address by Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner of the SEC., Texas
District Securities Industry Association, Dallas, Texas, April 10, 1972, at 2.
27 "The advisory and other services that brokerage firms customarily provide with-
out separate charge constitute a part of the compensation for investor patronage."
PH, supra note 2, at 164. The advisory contracts of many investment advisers expressly
or impliedly authorize use of brokerage commissions for "corroborative" research to sup-
plement the advice purchased by advisory fees. See SEC Rate Structure Investigation of
the National Securities Exchanges, File No. 4-144 at 779, 827-28, 1800, 2116 (1968-1969);
Robards, Do Brokers Give Better Advice to Institutions?, N.Y. Times, Dec, .5, 1971, If 3
at 2, col. 1. The SEC on a number of occasions in the past year has indicated its concern
over the difference in treatment between small and large investors. See address by Wil-
liam J. Casey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Invest-
ment Bankers Association of America, in Boca Raton, Florida, Dec. I, 1971, SEC News
Release (Dec. 8, 1971); SEC Statement of Policy, The Future Structure of the Securities
Markets (Feb., 1972). See also the SEC's Order for Public Proceedings, Butcher & Sher-
rerd, SEC Administrative Proceeding, File No. 3-3396 (Nov. 24, 1971).
28
 Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under '33 and
'34 Acts, Report of Disclosure Policy Study (1969).
29
 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,919; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9004
(Oct, 28, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,920; Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 9005 (Nov. 2, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. § 77,922; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9253 (July 19, 1971), 4 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 72,143; Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 9442 & 9443 (Jan. 10,
1972), [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,486. Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a-jj, certain issuers were not required to file reports under U 13
or 15(d), IS U.S.C. §§ 78m and 78o(d); however, they are now under some pressure
to register under If 12(g) and thereby voluntarily subject themselves to the reporting
requirements of § 13 of the 1934 Act, or alternatively, to make publicly available sub-
stantially similar information in order to permit holders of their restricted securities to
sell them under recently adopted Rule 144 of the 1933 Act. The Rule 144 provisions are
also intended to encourage more extensive company reporting. Securities Act Release No.
5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), in which the SEC adopted Rule 144, states:
If the issuer does not file reports pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, such persons should consider obtaining an agreement by the issuer
to register voluntarily under that Act so that Rule 144 may be available.
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it becomes increasingly more important that their officers be available
to explain its significance. In this framework, financial analysts clearly
have a necessary role. Portfolio managers, investment committees, se-
curities salesmen and individual investors can hope to obtain and as-
similate very little of the information accumulating in public files and
being reported in the financial press. The task must be delegated to
information middlemen who have enough ability and time to keep in-
formed of developments in specialized areas and enough access to
corporate management to develop complete and accurate analyses of
the investment values of large numbers of companies."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 10b-5 AND
ITS EFFECT ON INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Until recently, investment companies and other financial institu-
tions enjoyed unrestricted access to top management. It was generally
believed that any information ferreted out by a resourceful analyst
was available for use in any manner he desired." Moreover, many
corporate insiders unhesitatingly passed on even clearly material, non-
public information to friends and associates or acted on it them-
39 The importance of unrestricted access to corporate management has been uni-
versally recognized. See Gearhart, Corporate Management and the Analysts, 23 Financial
Analysts J. No, 5, at 31 (Sept.-Oct. 1967); Disclosure: The SEC and the Press, Address
by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, Univ. of Connecticut, C. M. Loeb Awards
Luncheon, in New York City, May 21, 1968; Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of
the SEC, before the Institutional Trading Conference, in New York City, June 17, 1971,
at 9-11; Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, before the Conference
Board, in New York City, Nov. 18, 1971 at 5-7. See also New York Stock Exchange
Company Manual, § A2, at A-18 to A-20 (1968); American Stock Exchange Company
Guide, pt. 4, at 108 (Apr. 15, 1968).
al Even today the Financial Analysts Federation, the national association of finan-
cial analysts societies, does not specifically prohibit the seeking or using of material,
nonpublic corporate information in its Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional
Conduct. The Standards of Professional Conduct provide only that "ftlhe financial analyst
shall have and maintain knowledge of and shall comply strictly with all federal, state and
provincial laws as well as with all rules and regulations of any governmental agency
governing his activities." The Financial Analysts Federation, 1972 Membership Directory
32 (1972).
On October 3, 1968, shortly after the SEC announced public administrative proceed-
ings against the financial institutions named as respondents in Investors Management Co.,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 77,832 (1970), and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit announced its decision in the SEC's suit against Texas
Gulf Sulphur, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 407 F.2d 453 (1968), the President of the
Financial Analysts Federation stated that "analysts should continue to seek substantive,
but not privileged information by all appropriate means." Bissell, Corporate Disclosure
and Inside Information, 24 Financial Analysts J. No. 6, at 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1968). The
statement was prompted by a concern, held by many analysts, that the two developments
would result in issuers initiating a "closed-doors" policy. For the SEC's reply to the
expressions of concern, see Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, Meeting
of North American Securities Administrators, in Bar Harbour, Florida, Oct. 8, 1968; see
also Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, Univ. of Connecticut, C. M.
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selves.' It was thought that, except in certain extraordinary cases,
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the only
restriction on use of inside information." During the 1955 public hear-
ings by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the stock
Loeb Awards Luncheon, New York City, May 21, 1968.
Interestingly enough, however, many local financial analysts' associations have their
own closed-door policies. They refuse to permit members of the public or press to attend
their meetings with corporate officials. See Newman, Analysts' Closed Talks with Firms
Are Called Unfair by Press, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Stabler,
New Strictures Prompt Firms to Revise Policies on Disclosure of News, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Oct. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
82 See Stabler, New Strictures Prompt Firms to Revise Policies on Disclosure of
News, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 6; Green, SEC Sees Court Rulings on
`Insider' Trading Changing Brokers' Method of Operations, Wall Street Journal, Sept, 3,
1968, at 30, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
In a 1962 survey of "reputable" businessmen, 42% indicated that they would trade
on inside information and 61% believed that the "average" investor would do likewise.
Baumhart, How Ethical are Businessmen, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug., 1961, exhibit II at
16. The question to which these responses were given was: "Imagine that you are a
member of the board of directors of a large corporation. At a board meeting you learn
of an impending merger with a smaller company which has had an unprofitable year,
and whose stock is presently selling at a price so Iow that you are certain it will rise
when news if the merger becomes public knowledge." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., after being charged by the SEC staff in the Investors Management pro-
ceedings with passing on to a small number of favored institutional customers material
inside information obtained as the prospective managing underwriter of a proposed
public offering, mailed to all of its customers a letter dated Aug. 28, 1968, which stated:
"[W]e do not belieVe we have done anything wrong or anything that violates the
ethical principles on which we have always sought to do business." (A copy of the letter
is on file in the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review Office).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The surprise expressed by many persons in the
securities business at the reach of the holdings in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), and Investors Management Co. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1.1 77,832 (1970), aff'd by the Commission, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163 (1971), has been chronicled by many publications. See,
e.g., The Law: Trouble for the Top, Forbes, Sept. 1, 1968, at 23; Bermingham, The
Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, Trusts and Estates, Oct. 1968, at 927; Landau, The Inside
Information Controversy and Its Impact, Inst. Inv., Dec. 1968, at 31.
Section 16(b) applies only to officers, directors and persons who are direct or indirect
beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of equity securities and is generally referred
to as the "insider trading" provision of the federal securities laws. See 2 L. Loss, Securi-
ties Regulations 1037-1132 (2d ed. 1961). It is a remedial provision which permits a cor-
poration, or a stockholder on the corporation's behalf, to recapture any profit realized
by such insiders from short-swing trading in the corporation's equity securities. The per-
tinent part provides:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such trans-
action of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
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market, the president of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) confirmed, without qualification, the accuracy of the state-
ment that "[t] here is absolutely no prohibition on insider trading in
the over-the-counter markets.""
Since the 1955 hearings, the SEC and the federal courts" have
established that the prohibitions of Section 10(b) 88 of the 1934 Act
84
 Hearings on Factors Influencing the Buying and Selling of Equity Securities
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1955).
Two weeks later, at the same hearings, the Chairman of the SEC was questioned by the
Committee's Staff Director regarding proscriptions against the use of inside information;
the following colloquy, remarkable by today's standards, was recorded:
MR. WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, there are certain regulations now with respect
to insider trading on a 6-month basis, the profits of which would be recoverable
by the corporation or a stockholder. Is it illegal for the officer to divulge inside
information to anybody else to use for the basis of trading?
MR. DEMMLER. I think that is a hypothetical question which I could not
answer. It would all depend on the circumstances.
MR. WALLACE, I cannot see that a question as to the legality of divulging
inside information is hypothetical. As I understand it, on this insider trading
proposition there is no regulation on unlisted securities?
Ma. DEMMLER. Except for rule X-10B-5 and section 17 of the Securities
Act.
Ma. WALLACE. But those provisions relate to fraud, not insider trading. So
that an officer or director would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by
participating on insider trading, since all he could lose would be the profits, and
there are no criminal penalties?
Mx. DEMMLER. Well, he also pays a tax on the profits and gets the profits
taken away, so he loses the profits plus the tax.
Ma. WALLACE. He would lose the tax on the profits, too?
Ma. DEMMT.FR. I think I am correct in my statement of the tax law. So it
is not correct to say he has everything to gain and nothing to lose.
Ma. WALLACE, So all he has to lose is the tax on his profits?
MR. DEMMLER He has the tax on his profits to lose and, of course, it prob-
ably costs him something to defend the action.
MR. WALLACE. And there is no illegality in disclosing any inside information
to anyone?
MR. DEMMLER. I did not say that. I said that would depend on the cir-
cumstances, Mr. Wallace.
MR. WALLACE. Well, you mentioned rule X-10B-5 and section 17 of the
Securities Act. Were you not talking about fraudulent action or betraying of
trust of the corporation?
Ma. DEMLLLER. Well, I can conceive of all kinds of imaginative situations
in which it might be illegal. I can conceive of other situations in which the
statute would not have been violated in any way. You may have questions of
State law involved. It is just too hypothetical a question to answer.
Id. at 964-65. Not unexpectedly, similar views were expressed by officers of institutional
investors. Id. at 536.
85 Actions for violations of the 1934 Act must be brought in federal court, 15
U.S.0 § 78aa (1974).
au 15 U.S.C. if 78j(b) (1970) provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
• • •
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
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and Rule 10b-5 thereunder" do extend to trading by corporate
insiders in the over-the-counter markets and much more, as well. In
Cady, Roberts & Co.," the first" of the three significant cases to
develop the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to "tippees,"" an employee
of a brokerage firm who was also a director of Curtiss-Wright Cor-
poration disclosed to one of the firm's partners that Curtiss-Wright
had just decided to reduce its quarterly dividend. Realizing that the
news had not yet been carried by news services, the partner immedi-
ately sold shares of Curtiss-Wright for his wife and a number of
discretionary accounts. Although the partner was not an "insider" in
the traditional sense,'". the SEC found that he had violated Rule 10b-5,
and suspended his membership in the New York Stock Exchange.'
The SEC reached this result by establishing a broad definition of in-
sider, premised on a "special relationship" which gives a person direct
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
87 17 C.F.R.	 240.10b-5 (1971) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
Or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
88 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39 Even prior to 1955, a violation of Rule 10b-5 was found where a majority stock-
holder bad purchased stock from minority stockholders without disclosing that the value
of the issuer's tobacco inventory had greatly appreciated from the cost figure shown on
the issuer's books. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). In a
previous case brought on the same set of facts, it was held that the defendant's conduct
did not amount to common law fraud because no fraudulent misrepresentation had been
made. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 55 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943).
40 The term "tippee" refers to a person who receives a "tip," generally information
which has not been made public. The term was probably first used by Professor Loss. See
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961). .
41 Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 	 78p(b) (1970), generally referred to
as the "insider trading" provision, applies only to officers, directors and persons who are
the direct or indirect beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of equity security.
See 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1037-1132 (2d ed. 1961). In Cady, Roberts the SEC
acknowledged that the "affirmative duty to disclose material information has been tra-
ditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders." 40 S.E.C. at 911.
42 40 S.E.C. at 917-18. The associate died in 1960 and was not a respondent in the
proceedings. Id. at 909.
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or indirect access to corporate information." The SEC had no diffi-
culty finding that the Cady, Roberts partner, by virtue of his relation-
ship to the Cady, Roberts employee who was a director of Curtiss-
Wright, fell within this group of "access" insiders."
The second, and undoubtedly most important, case in the develop-
ment of Rule 10b-5 is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Ca:" The case in-
volved a mineral find in Timmins, Ontario, by engineers of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. On April 12, 1964, Texas Gulf officials acted to sub-
due stock-market rumors that the company had discovered a rich cop-
per lode. The company issued a press release describing its mineral
research in the area as merely "a prospect" and reported that circulat-
ing rumors were "premature and possibly misleading."' Four days
later the company issued a second release announcing a major copper
strike at Timmins.47 In its suit, the SEC charged that the company
had violated Rule lob-5 when it issued a press release which it knew,
or should have known, was materially misleading. The SEC also
charged that between November 12, 1963, when the results of the first
43
 Former Chairman William L. Cary indicated that:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements ; first, the ex-
istence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing. In considering these elements under the broad language
of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions
and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is to identify those persons who are
in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and
thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands
restraint lest the uninformed be exploited.
40 S.E.C. at 912 (emphasis added).
44 The facts here impose on . . . [the partner] the responsibilities of those
commonly referred to as "insiders." He received the information prior to its
public release from a director of Curtiss-Wright . . . who was associated with
the registrant. . . . [The director's] relationship to the company clearly pro-
hibited him from selling the securities affected by the information without
disclosure. By logical sequence, it should prohibit Gintel, a partner of the reg-
istrant.
Id. at 913.
45 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S.
976 and Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Texas Gulf Sulphur is the most significant
because of its treatment of corporate publicity as well as insider trading. In his con-
curring opinion, Judge Friendly commented on the corporate publicity aspect of the
case as "transcending in public importance all others in this important case...." 401 F.2d at
866. The court held that corporate publicity is subject to the Rule whenever it is issued
"in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of
the financial media. . . ." Id. at 862. This is true "irrespective of whether the insiders
contemporaneously trade in the securities of ... [the company issuing the press relcasel
and irrespective of whether the corporation or its management have an ulterior purpose
or purposes in making an official public release. . . ." Id. at 860-61.
46
 Id. at 845.
47 Id. at 846.
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test hole were examined and showed significant mineralization, and
April 16, 1964, when the second press release was issued, a group of
Texas Gulf officials had violated the Rule when they bought 12,100
shares of Texas Gulf stock, bought "calls"" on 5,200 shares and re-
ceived employee options to buy 31,200 shares. The SEC further
charged that some of the defendants had committed additional viola-
tions when they gave tips to friends and relatives who bought 14,100
shares and calls for another 14,100.
In an en Banc decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit" sustained the SEC charges in virtually every major respect. With
regard to the insider trading aspects of the case, the court reversed in
part the district court and held that a corporate insider in posses-
sion of material inside information about his company "may not take
'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing,' i.e., the investing public . ."" He "must either
disclose it to the investing public," or abstain from trading in the com-
pany's securities until it is disclosed.' The court also unanimously
held that Rule 10b-5 prohibits corporate insiders from passing inside
information on to their friends, relatives or associates for use in securi-
ties transactions."
Since the SEC did not include any tippees among the individuals
it sued, the Second Circuit did not specifically hold that tippees may
themselves be covered by Rule 10b-5." The opportunity to establish
that principle was presented to the SEC in In re Management Inves-
tors Co., the third major case under the Rule, an administrative pro-
ceeding ordered on the basis of SEC staff charges against Merrill
Lynch, fourteen of its officers and salesmen and fifteen of its institu-
tional customers." The SEC staff charged" that in June, 1966, Merrill
4° A call is an option which gives the holder the contractual right to buy a fixed
amount of a certain stock at a fixed price within a specified time.
49 The district court had found most of the SEC charges against Texas Gulf Sulphur
unjustified and had exonerated all but two of the thirteen individual defendants. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5° 401 F.24 at 8443.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 843, 852.
58 The court, however, did give a clear indication of its position on the matter:
As Darke's "tippees" are not defendants in this action, we need not decide
whether, if they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the material
information was undisclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as
the conduct of their insider source, though we note that it certainly could be
equally reprehensible.
Id. at 852-53.
" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-1680
(Aug. 26, 1968).
The 15 institutional investors included one investment company registered under
the 1940 Act; two investment advisers registered pursuant to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 to 18a (1970); four unregistered investment advisers to
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Lynch, while acting as prospective managing underwriter of a pro-
posed $75 million offering a Douglas Aircraft Company convertible
debentures, had learned that Douglas' six-month's earnings would be
only twelve cents a share. Less than three weeks earlier, Douglas had
published a report declaring earnings of eighty-five cents a share for
the five-month period. The staff also charged that certain respondents
had paid Merrill Lynch for this inforMation with commissions on se-
curities transactions and customer-directed "give-ups."" Pursuant to
an offer of settlement by Merrill Lynch," the SEC found that the
material inside information had been passed on to favored institutional
customers before it was disclosed to the public.
Although Merrill Lynch had negotiated a settlement and had
agreed to the imposition of sanctions, all but one of the institutional
respondents defended against the staff charges before an SEC Hearing
Examiner." After a hearing, the Examiner, ruling that Rule 10b-5
does extend to the conduct of tippees, found that twelve of the respon-
dents had violated the Rule in connection with sales of approximately
153,000 shares of Douglas stock." The Examiner held that no viola-
tion had occurred in the case of one respondent who was found to
have had possession of the inside information but not to have made
any sales of Douglas stock on the basis of that information." Attrib-
uting the "respondents' blindness to . . . obligations [they owed] .. .
registered investment companies; and six private investment partnerships, so-called
"hedge funds". Id.
65 See SEC Order for Public Proceedings in SEC Administrative Proceeding File
No. 3-1680 (Aug. 26, 1968) at 3-7.
58
 A "give-up" occurred when an executing broker surrendered a portion of his com-
mission to another broker who did not participate in the particular transaction. See In-
vestors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,832,
at 83,951 n.48 (June 26, 1970); SEC, Public Policy Implications of Investment Company
Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-72 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
PPI]. Customer-directed give-ups of the type involved in the Merrill Lynch case were
prohibited on December 5, 1968. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8399 (Sept. 4,
1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,599.
67
 As part of the settlement procedure, respondents in SEC administrative proceed-
ings frequently consent to findings of violations of the federal securities laws without
admitting any of the allegations. Based upon the offer of settlement of Merrill Lynch
and its officers and salesmen, the SEC ordered Merrill Lynch's New York Institutional
Sales and West Coast Underwriting Offices closed for 21 and 15 days, respectively; cen-
sured 10 of its employees; and ordered 7 of them temporarily to disassociate themselves
from employment with Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,629.
58 Like Merrill Lynch, the remaining institutional respondent submitted an offer
of settlement, which the SEC accepted, providing for censure. City Associates, [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,599.
59 Investors Management Co, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 77,832. No sanctions were imposed against one respondent because it had no super-
visory responsibilities over a controlled subsidiary which was censured, or against a
successor corporation to another respondent which was also censured.
60
 Id. at 83,961.
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the investing public . . . to undue self-interest," the Hearing Examiner
recommended only that they be censured, due to "the fact that the
record does not evidence deliberate intent by respondents to flout
the law for financial gain, nor does it appear that respondents engaged
in previous misconduct.""
Although none of the respondents sought Commission review of
the Hearing Examiner's decision, the SEC, in an unusual move, an-
nounced that, because of the "significant implications" of the issues
involved, it would on its own motion review the proceedings and ex-
press its own views." Subsequently, the SEC staff and certain respon-
dents flied briefs with the Commission and, in somewhat of an anti-
climax, the Commission affirmed the Hearing Examiner's sanctions."
The Commission's opinion is significant, nevertheless, for its statement
of the elements of tippee responsibility under Rule 10b-5:
[1] that the information in question be material and [2] non-
public; [3] that the tippee, whether he receives the informa-
tion directly or indirectly, know or have reason to know that
it was non-public and had been obtained improperly by se-
lective revelation or otherwise, and [4] that the information
be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction."
Like Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Investors Manage-
ment decision has recognized new disclosure responsibilities under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. The result of these decisions is the
imposition of restrictions on conduct of investment companies that was
previously regarded as being beyond the scope of the federal securities
laws.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF TIPPEE
RESPONSIBILITY
A. Materiality
An important limitation on the scope of Rule 10b-5 is the require-
ment that any misstatement or omission made be of a material fact."
The court of appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur phrased the standard of
al Id. at 83,962.
42 Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,163 at 80,515.
63 Id. at 80,522.
e4 Id. at 80,519.
05 The requirement that a material fact be involved was incorporated into Rule
10b-5 directly from {I 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 § 77q(a) (1970), after which
Rule 10b-5 was designed. For a description of its origin, see remarks of Milton Freeman,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. Lawyer 793, 922
(1967). Materiality is one of the elements of common law deceit, W. Prosser, Torts § 108
at 718-20 (4th ed. 1971).
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materiality in terms of the traditional common law tort standard, that
the information might be important to a "reasonable" investor." The
court went on to explain that this test encompasses information that
"in reasonable and objective contemplation" might affect the market
price of the stock." Viewing the glowing reports of the strike pub-
lished at the time of the second announcement and "the importance
attached to the drilling results by those who knew about it,"" the court
stated that "[o]ur survey of the facts below conclusively establishes
that knowledge of the results of the discovery hole, K-55-1, would
have been important to a reasonable investor and might have affected
the price of the stock."" In its opinion accepting Merrill Lynch's offer
of settlement, however, the SEC apparently rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's standard in favor of one designed to establish "a relatively high
threshold of materiality." 70 ' The SEC found the Douglas earnings
information to be material because it "was of such importance that
it could be expected to affect the judgment of investors whether to
buy, sell or hold Douglas stock [and, if] generally know[n] . . . to
affect materially the market price of the stock."Ti
The important difference between the standards enunciated by
the SEC and the Second Circuit lies in their alternative, market-impact
phraseology."' The SEC for some time has insisted that there must
00
 See, e.g., 1 F. Harper and F. James, Torts 565-66 (1956); W. Prosser, Torts 108
at 718-19 (4th ed. 1971).
07
 401 F.2d at 849. The Second Circuit first formulated its standard of materiality
in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, sub nom., List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811, where the court declared that information is material if "a
reasonable man would attach importance" to it and if "in reasonable and objective con-
templation [it] might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities." Id. at
462 (emphasis added). The court expressly reaffirmed the standard in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d at 849. Subsequently, in SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), Judge Friendly noted: "This court has
defined a material fact as a fact to which 'a reasonable man would attach importance .. .
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.' . . . We have further
developed our views on materiality in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. . . ." Id. at
459-60.
Both tests have been adopted by other courts. Myzel v. Fields, 386 Fid 718, 734
n.7 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951; Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260,
266 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); accord,
SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 366 F.2d 456, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1966), rehearing denied
per curiam, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991; List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom., List v. Lerner, 382
U.S. 811.
08 401 F.2d at 851.
69 Id. at 850.
70 The phrase was used by Commissioner Smith to describe, with approval, the
SEC's test. Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 11 78,163 at 80,523.
71 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,629 at 83,350.
72 It would not appear that any significance should be attached to the SEC's failure
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exist likelihood of a "material" effect on the market price of a com-
pany's securities before a violation of Rule 10b-5 can occur;" but
the Second Circuit would appear to require only the possibility of an
effect on market price:" The differing standards may produce different
to refer to a "reasonable" investor. In Texas Gulf Sulphur the district court had de-
clared that "the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative one" and excluded
speculators from the class of "reasonable men." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court of appeals reversed, admonishing the lower
court by stating that "[t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also
'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders."
401 F.2d at 849.
78
 For a number of years prior to the Merrill Lynch opinion, the members of the
Commission and its staff consistently had described the materiality element in terms
similar to those used by the Commission in Merrill Lynch. See address by former Com-
missioner Hamer H. Budge of the SEC before the New York Chapter of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, in New York, Nov. 18, 1965 ("significant information");
Ferber, Disclosure of Corporate Information, 22 Financial Analysts J. 19, 20 (July-
Aug. 1966) (facts which "might reasonably be expected to have a substantial effect
on the price of the company's securities"); comments of David Ferber, Solicitor, Office
of General Counsel, SEC, in Texas Gulf Sulphur—Insider Disclosure Problems 314 (A.
Fleischer & J. Flom, Co-Chairmen, PLI 1968) (information "which has an immediate
and substantial effect on the price of the stock").
Shortly after the Merrill Lynch settlement, the SEC released an opinion containing
a reference to the Texas Gulf Sulphur definition which could have implied unreserved
affirmation of the Second Circuit's test. Blyth & Company, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder)
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, II 77,647 at 83,397 ilia. Only two weeks later, however, the
Merrill Lynch formulation was expressly reaffirmed in Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 77,656 (1969). See also Address by
Former Chairman Manuel F. Cohen of the SEC before the Baltimore Securities Analysts
Society, in Baltimore, Md., Jan. 6, 1969.
74 The SEC has indicated its belief that the market-impact phrasing of the standard
by the court of appeals is in reality the same test as the one the Commission adopted
in Merrill Lynch and Investors Management. In its brief in opposition to a petition for
a writ of certiorari filed by one of the Texas Gulf Sulphur defendants, the SEC stated:
Petitioner argues that the court of appeals correctly stated that a substantial
prospective market impact is necessary to render inside information material and
then departed from this standard by dispensing with the requirement of sub-
stantiality (Pet. 17-18). We, however, read the phrase "in reasonable and ob-
jective contemplation" as designed to exclude matters which might cause insub-
stantial market fluctuations.
Respondents Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 13 n.8, Kline v SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (emphasis in original).
The court of appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur did cite with approval a statement of
materiality by a former SEC staff attorney similar to the one expressed by the SEC:
An insider's duty to disclose information or his duty to abstain from dealing in
his company's securities arises only in "those situations which are essentially
extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial
effect on the market price of the security if [the extraordinary situation is]
disclosed" [citation omitted].
401 F.2d at 848. It is doubtful, however, whether the court intended thereby to adopt
a market-impact test which requires a "material" effect on the market price of a stock.
For in the same part of the opinion, the court repeated its phraseology that the term,
"encompasses any fact . . . which in reasonable and objective contemplation might
affect the value of the corporation's stock . . . ." Id. at 849 (emphasis added by the
court),
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results with respect to a broad range of corporate activity. Some de-
velopments might not be considered material by the SEC but they
could •
 be so considered by a court following Texas Gulf Sulphur.
For example, it is probable that news of slightly higher earnings,
or of an interesting new product with only conjectural possibilities
or of a continued gradual decline in profit margins would not be
considered material under the SEC standard, since such information
is not likely to "materially affect the market price of stock.' But
it is quite possible that a court applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur stan-
dard would find such information material, because the information
could be found to be the type as to which "a reasonable man would
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action . . . .”"
Unfortunately, the confusion resulting from the differences between
the two tests may very well end up being resolved by the courts, at
the expense of investors who acted in reliance on the SEC's standard,
but who nevertheless are found by the court to have violated the Rule.
Regardless which test is used, there is general agreement that cer-
tain types of corporate information generally should be considered ma-
terial." These would include news of a sizeable reduction or increase
in dividends," a sharp increase or decline in earnings," an increase or
75
 See Fleischer, Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading, 45 Harv. Bus. Rev. 129,
130 (Jan. 1967).
76
 See 401 F.2d at 849 quoting Restatement of Torts, ; 538(2)(a) at 86 (1938).
77
 The American Stock Exchange has supplied companies with the following list
of situations that generally require prompt disclosure and that could be considered as
material by the SEC or by a court:
(a) a joint venture, merger or acquisition;
(b) the declaration or omission of dividends or the determination of earnings;
(c) a stock split or stock dividend;
(d) the acquisition or loss of a significant contract;
(e) a significant new product or discovery;
(f) a change in control or a significant change in management;
(g) a call of securities for redemption;
(h) the borrowing of a significant amount of funds;
(i) the public or private sale of a significant amount of additional securities;
(j) significant litigation;
(k) the purchase or sale of a significant asset;
(1) a significant change in capital investment plans;
(m) a significant labor dispute or disputes with subcontractors or suppliers;
(n) an event requiring the filing of a current report under the Securities Ex-
change Act;
(o) establishment of a program to make purchases of the company's own shares;
and
(p) a tender offer for another company's securities.
American Stock Exchange Company Guide, pt. 4, at 103-04 (April 15, 1968).
78
 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (reduction of dividend from $.625
per share to $.375 per share was material) ; Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp.
239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (reduction of dividend caused by controlling person in order to
facilitate purchase program).
70
 Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1096
INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND INSIDE INFORMATION
decrease in sales," the progress of a significant mineral exploration
program," and major financing problems." The information does not
have to involve current developments; it can also involve impending
corporate developments such as a proposed stock offering by a closely
held company,' the planned liquidation of a subsidiary at a dramatic
profit, or the sale of a corporation's assets." Projections of sales, earn-
ings, cash flow and acquisitions can also be covered by the Rule," as
well as news that previously reported projections were significantly
inaccurate.'
Normally, such information would probably not be disclosed to an
analyst or researcher.8T Most likely, interviews are limited to such mat-
77,832 (decline in earnings from 85 cents for five-month period to 12 cents for six
months); Mates Financial Services, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 77,790 (quarterly increase from $.03 loss to $.15 earnings) ; Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,656 (pre-tax earnings for
nine-month period almost five times greater than prior year).
80 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., id. (sales of over $2 million for two-month period
versus $3 million for entire prior year) ; Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968) (actual sales of $15,000 versus original projection of $573,100).
81 401 F.2d at 833.
82 Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968) ("required
extensive financing .. was not obtainable").
83 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (proposed private offering
at $300 per share and public offering at $600 per share at the time of purchase at $120
per share).
84 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), supp. opinion, 100
F. Supp. 461, petition for order to reopen case denied, 100 F. Supp. 463 (sale of subsidiary
to obtain undisclosed inventory profit) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798
(E.D. Pa. 1947) (agreement to sell entire assets made 8 hours before delivery of plain-
tiff's stock).
85 SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 92,280 (1968) ; Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep, 77,656.
88 See Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
87 The New York Stock Exchange Company Manual provides:
A company should not give information to one inquirer which it would not
give to another. Nor should it reveal information it would not willingly give to
the press for publication. Thus, for corporations to give advance earnings, divi-
dend, stock split, merger, or tender information to analysts, whether representing
an institution, brokerage house, investment advisor, large stockholder, or anyone
else, would be clearly incompatible with Exchange policy, On the other hand,
it should not withhold information in which analysts or other members of the
investing public have a warrantable interest.
NYSE Company Manual, a A2, at A-20 (1968).
Recent statements by the Chairman of the SEC have implied that companies may
have some duty to undertake the impossible task of policing what analysts say about
them. In one speech the Chairman stated that "if a company knows that an analyst
has made an accurate projection on what a new product or some new development will
do to a company's earnings per share and that his projection will be given to investors,
this combination of events creates an obligation for the company to make some kind of
announcement." The Public Interest in Our Securities Markets, Address by Chairman
William J. Casey of the SEC before the Institutional Trading Conference, in New York
City, June 17, 1971, SEC News Release (June 17, 1971) at 10-11.
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ters as general management and labor relations, the development of
new products, planned inventory levels, information on performance
and prospects for various products or product groups, clarification of
financial statements and projected capital or research and development
expenditures." Absent an extraordinary occurrence, individual pieces
of information of this type are not considered material because they
would likely not have a direct effect on a reasonable investor's judg-
ment or the market price of a company's stock. But if the pieces of
information obtained by an analyst were aggregated, the sum could
very well be a principal factor" in his investment decision. The ques-
tion therefore arises whether extensive collections of various items of
nonpublic, nonmaterial information should be held to violate either the
SEC's or the Second Circuit's standard of materiality.
It is submitted, however, that a test which takes into account the
cumulative effect of nonmaterial information would eliminate mate-
riality as an element, and would impose an unreasonable burden on
investment companies. Such a test would probably prove to be impos-
sible of application in practice. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
such a rule would serve to place investors on a more equal footing,
although it certainly would deter analysts and researchers from dig-
ging behind or seeking clarification of published corporate reports."
The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur sought to dispel any ques-
tion that its standard of materiality encompasses the type of knowl-
edge which corporate insiders usually possess in connection with the
management of a company. For the sake of consistency, it would seem
only logical that the elements of responsibility for analysts who obtain
nonpublic information from an insider should be no different from
those applied to the insider himself.
As in the case of corporate insiders, analysts may be guided in
their investment decisions by more than "superior financial or other
The Chairman of the SEC also stated that be believes management may have an
obligation to make a public announcement whenever it confirms or corrects a projection
by analysts. Id. See also Responsibilities and Liabilities in Corporate Life, Address by
Chairman William J. Casey of the SEC before the Conference Board, in New York City,
Nov. 18, 1971, SEC News Release (November 18, 1971). Presumably the obligation
arises only if the projections involve material information.
88 See Bjork, The Views of the Analysts, in Texas Gulf Sulphur: Disclosure and
Insiders 187 (A. Fleischer & J. Flom, Co-chairmen, PLI 1968).
89
 The SEC has stated that the material information need only be "a factor" in a
tippee's decision to trade. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 78,163
at 80,522.
99
 If the subject matter of an interview consists only of generally known facts, it
is beyond question that no responsibility exists under Rule 10b-5. To paraphrase Professor
Loss' statement on insiders, an analyst or other investor is under no obligation to give
the public the benefit of his superior financial analysis. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regu-
lation, 1463 (2d ed. 1961).
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expert analysis,"°' and they may possess specialized knowledge about
the company, or at least about some aspects of its operations, or what
its future prospects might be. Despite whatever advantage this knowl-
edge may provide them over other investors, there is no justification
for applying a stricter test to analysts than is applied to insiders, for
the analyst will never be in any better investment position by virtue
of the knowledge than the insider. Evidently the SEC has adopted the
view that the standards for tippees should be the same as those for
insiders. In reaffirming the standard of materiality used in its Merrill
Lynch opinion, the SEC expressly declared in Investors Management
that "even if respondents are viewed as indirect recipients [tippeesi
of the Douglas information, the same criteria for finding a violation
of the anti-fraud provisions by the respondents properly apply.""
Although the apparent difference between the standards of mate-
riality adopted by the SEC and Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit may at times produce different results, both the court and the SEC
appear to agree on one important point: in the determination of whether
facts are material, a major factor is the "importance attached" to
the facts by those who know them." Evidence of trading activity
by the persons who obtain the information is "highly pertinent .. .
and the only true objective evidence of materiality . . ."" Because
the question whether the facts of a particular case are material will
likely be answered through hindsight, it is evident that any investment
company caught trading in securities shortly after obtaining nonpublic
information will have little chance of avoiding liability under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
B. Nonpublic Information
A difficult issue faced by . the Hearing Examiner and the SEC in
the Investors Management proceeding was whether the information
received from Merrill Lynch on the decline in Douglas' earnings had
become public. Some respondents testified that rumors of Douglas'
poor earnings results were circulating in the financial community on
June 21, 1966, the same day that the news was given to Merrill
Lynch's New York Institutional Sales Office, and that on June 22 the
91 401 F.2d at 849.
92 11970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,163 at 80,521. There
is no suggestion in the Hearing Examiner's opinion, either, that a stricter test than
materiality should be applied to tippees. Investors Management Co., Inc., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 77,832, at 83,940-941. Nor did the SEC staff
argue under any test other than the one applied to Merrill Lynch in their brief in
Investors Management. Brief for the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets Investors
Management Co., Admin, Proceedings File No. 3-1680 (Oct. 9, 1969).
" 401 F.2d at 851.
04 Id.
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rumors were widely known among a group of about fifty institutional
investors attending a luncheon." The SEC rejected the argument that
the circulation of the rumor was sufficient evidence that the news had
become publicly available. It found that the high quality of the Merrill
Lynch information—the specific figures of actual and projected earn-
ings and the attribution of the source to an access insider—in contrast
to the low quality of the rumors, served to establish that the informa-
tion they received was nonpublic." Moreover, the SEC declared that
even if the persons attending the luncheon had had the very same
information as that received from Merrill Lynch, that group would
be too limited in size "to constitute the kind of public disclosure that
would suffice to place other investors in an equal position in the mar-
ket place."" The test to be applied, according to the SEC, is whether
the information has "been disseminated in a manner making it avail-
able to investors generally." 98
The SEC standard appears to be compatible with that adopted
by the Second Circuit. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, Judge Waterman stated
that, "[la] efore insiders may act upon material information, such in-
formation must have been ef ectively disclosed in a manner sufficient
to insure its availability to the investing public."" In the case of one
defendant, there was unanimous agreement that he had violated Rule
10b-5 by placing his ordern° immediately after Texas Gulf made its
announcement, 101
 because, "[a]ssuming that the contents of the offi-
95
 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1I 78,163 at 80,519-520.
90
 Id. at 80,520.
97
 Id. Similarly, information disclosed at a financial analysts' meeting would not be
considered publicly available for Rule 10b-5 purposes. See Responsibilities and Liabilities
in Corporate Life, Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, before Conference
Board, New York City, Nov. 18, 1971, SEC News Release (Nov. 18, 1971).
98 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,163 at 80,520.
oo 401 F.2d at 854 (emphasis added).
100 It was held in Texas Gulf Sulphur, apparently unanimously, that "[t]he effective
protection of the public from insider exploitation of advance notice of material informa-
tion requires that the time that an insider places an order, rather than the time of its
ultimate execution, be determinative for Rule 10b-5 purposes." Id. at 853 n.17. The
statement of the two dissenting judges with regard to Coates that "for all practical
purposes the information had not become public at the time of his purchase order"
indicates their agreement with this conclusion. Id. at 888.
101 The lower court absolved one defendant who had placed his telephone order im-
mediately after the April 16th announcement was released to the financial press. 258 F.
Supp. at 288. The Second Circuit stated that in so doing, the lower court had "mis-
interpreted" the following dictum in Cady, Roberts:
[that insiders are to] "keep out of the market until the established procedures
for public release of the information are carried out instead of hastening to
execute transactions in advance of, and in frustration of, the objectives of the
release," 40 SEC at 915 (emphasis supplied).
401 F.2d at 854.
The sequence of events was as follows: the announcement was made in the United
States at 10:00 a.m. on April 16; the Dow Jones reporter left the press conference with
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cial release could be instantaneously acted upon, at the minimum .. .
[he] should have waited until the news could reasonably have been
expected to appear over the media of widest circulation, the Dow
Jones broad tape. . . ."'" The court's prefatory remark suggests that
insiders and tippees must wait until the news has been carried by the
financial services and is in the hands of investors.'" The SEC has prop-
erly defined the element of timing in terms of when there has occurred
adequate dissemination of the information by the new services.'" It is
not clear whether the SEC's use of the term "disseminated" in In-
vestors Management involves anything different than that required by
the Second Circuit's phrase "effectively disclosed" in Texas Gulf Sul-
phur.
As a practical matter, it can never be precisely ascertained
when investors have finished their evaluation and when the market
price of the stock reflects the new information. Although it is arguable
that the persons having inside information are in the best position to
judge when the time has occurred, this approach would nevertheless
unreasonably subject them to liability through hindsight. Often a
small company is unable to get news services to carry news the com-
pany believes is important; and alternative modes of dissemination
prove to be costly and less efficient means of communication.'" Some-
the release at approximately 10:10; Coates placed his telephone order shortly before
10:20; the news appeared on the Dow Jones broad tape at 10:54 and the Merrill Lynch
private wire at 10:29. Id. The court disregarded as ineffective an abbreviated version of
the press release which was given to the Canadian press at 9:40 am. Id. at 853-54.
102 401 F2d at 854 n.18.
108 In a note to this part of the majority opinion, Judge Waterman commented:
Although the only insider who acted after the news appeared over the Dow
Jones broad tape is not an appellant and therefore we need not discuss the
necessity of considering the advisability of a "reasonable waiting period" during
which outsiders may absorb and evaluate disclosures, we note in passing that,
where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable into investment
action, insiders may not take advantage of their advance opportunity to evaluate
the information by acting immediately upon dissemination. In any event, the
permissible timing of insider transactions after disclosures of various sorts is one
of the many areas of expertise for appropriate exercise of the SEC's rule-making
power, which we hope will be utilized in the future to provide some predicta-
bility of certainty for the business community.
Id. Immediately after the Texas Gull Sulphur opinion it was reported that the SEC was
considering the possibility of adopting a rule dealing with the question of what is a
"reasonable holding period." Green, SEC Considers Telling Insiders How Long to Wait
Before Trading on Company News, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 30, 1968, at 3, col. 2.
104 Both the New York and American Stock Exchanges have prepared detailed
procedures for public release of information, NYSE Company Manual, § A-2, A-22-4
(1968); American Stock Exchange Company Guide, pt. 4 at 106-08 (Apr. 15, 1968).
105
 If the financial services fail to report a company's announcement, or report it
inaccurately and fail to clarify the inaccuracy, it might become necessary for the com-
pany to transmit the information to its shareholders in some other manner, such as a
report or letter, before orders can be placed. The SEC staff has taken the position that
teletyping press releases directly to broker-dealers for small companies which have diffi-
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times initial investor reaction is opposite to what was expected, and
it becomes unclear whether a contrary market reaction will then fol-
low.'" At other times the price of a stock will continue to rise, or fall,
for some time after an announcement. For example, in the case of an
important acquisition the market price of the stock of the acquired
company may continue to rise steadily after the initial announcement,
as investor confidence in the likelihood of the event taking place be-
comes stronger.
Because it is difficult under both the court and SEC tests to de-
termine when an insider or tippee is no longer obligated to remain
silent and inert, there will always be a period of uncertainty following
publication of news over wire services as to whether sufficient dis-
semination has occurred. This specific issue was raised in Texas Gulf
Sulphur by three defendants who argued that they honestly believed
that the news of the mineral discovery had become public by the time
they placed their orders. The majority opinion rejected their defense
of "good faith" for the reason that proof of specific intent to defraud
is unnecessary in an enforcement proceeding, and that in such a case
negligence will support a violation of Rule 10b-5.107 In the court's
view, the defendants' beliefs were not reasonable in view of the fact
that their orders had obviously been placed before the news of the
announcement was adequately disseminated!"
The analysis of the Second Circuit in this respect is similar to
that in its discussion of materiality!' The result obtained is that an
culty getting news media to carry their announcements would not constitute public
disclosure. Letter from SEC Office of Chief Counsel to Boss & Company Inc., March 13,
1972, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,663.
106
 See, e.g., the situation described in University of Pennsylvania Law School Confer-
ence on Mutual Funds, Mutual Funds as Investors of Large Pools of Money, 115 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 669, 721 (1967).
107
 401 F.2d at 854-56. Although the court's holding was limited to the proposition
that negligence will support a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 in an injunctive proceed-
ing by the SEC, other courts have held that negligence is also sufficient in a private action
for damages. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951;
City National Bank v. Vanderbloom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). In a footnote to the City National Bank decision, the Eighth
Circuit suggested, despite Judge Friendly's strong statement otherwise in a concurring
opinion, that language in Texas Gulf Sulphur "permits the inference that the Second
Circuit may be on the verge of dropping the scienter requirement in private actions."
422 F.2d at 230 n.9. While some uncertainty still exists in the Second Circuit, other circuit
courts have required fraud as an element of a cause of action under section 10b and Rule
10-5. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1(93,428
(3d Cir. March 31, 1972) ; Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
108
 The court stated that "a mistaken belief as to the applicable law ... does not
insulate . . . [insiders] from the consequences of their acts . . ." although presumably a
mistake of fact would be a defense. 401 F.2d at 852 n.15. The four separately concurring
judges agreed, with Judge Friendly stating that "[w]hile . . . an erroneous view of the
law is pardonable, it is not 'good faith' in the legal sense." Id. at 868 n.4.
109
 See text accompanying notes 93 and 94 supra.
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investment company which acts on material information immediately
after it is made public, but before it is digested by investors, incurs
substantial exposure to liability for a violation of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Although the SEC standard provides relatively greater
certainty in a number of situations, both tests make it unwise for an
investment company to attempt to gain any advantage over other in-
vestors from material, nonpublic information in the period immedi-
ately following public announcement of the information. Indeed, any
trading in the stock concerned, even if scheduled for reasons unrelated
to the inside information, will risk misinterpretation by a court. The
investment company is not unduly penalized by this situation, which
assumes that it already had material information in its possession. The
average investor just receiving that information deserves some "re-
sponse time" before be is at a par with the professional investor.
C. Requisite Knowledge
Since their business is investing and reinvesting in securities, in-
vestment companies are always in the market for information. An
investment company may be subject to the requirements of Rule 10b-5
if it obtains material, nonpublic information (1) in connection with
a purchase of restricted securities from an issuer under the private
offering exemption of the Securities Act of 1933; 10 (2) from one of
its affiliated persons who is a corporate insider of the issuer;ni or (3)
from a company's investment banking firm.112 Similarly, a duty under
110 In such a case the investment company itself will acquire a "special relationship"
with respect to the issues and thereby become an access insider. Cf. Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. at 912. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
111 Section 2(a) (3) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(3) (1970), defines affiliated
person to mean:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power
to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other
person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting
securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with such other person; (D) any
officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if
such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or
any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an
unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the
depositor thereof.
112 Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,163 at 80,519; Investors Management Co. 11970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,832 at 83,939-40. The respondents in the Merrill Lynch proceeding
argued that, if they were tippers, they were only "remote tippees," as distinguished from
the partner-tippee of Cady, Roberts. The SEC rejected this as a rationale for distin-
guishing their case:
Although the case of such an indirect recipient may present more questions of
factual proof of the requisite knowledge, the need for the protections of those
provisions in the tippee area is unaffected.
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Rule 10b-5 should arise if (4) a financial analyst for an investment
company or its investment adviser directly obtains material, nonpublic
information in an interview with a corporate official and passes it on
to the investment company.'"
In the first two cases there is little question that the investment
company would be considered an insider under the standards estab-
lished in Cady, Roberts and affirmed by the Second Circuit in Texas
Gulf Sulphur, for in each case it is evident that the investment com-
pany has acquired a significant investment advantage as the result of
a special relationship it has, directly or indirectly, with respect to the
issuer. In the other two cases, the investment company would be con-
sidered subject to Rule 10b-5 under the rationale of Investors Man-
agement. But there remains the question of whether an investment
company may become subject to Rule 10b-5's proscriptions in other
situations, such as when the information originates from a corporate
source but reaches the company through several intermediaries, or
when the information is provided by someone with no special relation-
ship or access to the issuer.
Although the prohibitions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply
to "any person," 114
 it has never been suggested that the duty to dis-
close material, nonpublic information or refrain from trading in the
securities of the company to which it relates applies without limit to
all investors. In its decision in Cady, Roberts the SEC described the
element limiting the scope of the Rule as "the existence of a relation-
ship giving access directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the benefit of anyone
. . . ." 1 " The SEC held that in addition to persons such as officers,
directors and employees, all of whom are privy to confidential corporate
information by virtue of their direct relationship with a corporation,
the Rule also covers persons who might be characterized as "access"
insiders because of some direct or indirect "special relationship" to
the corporation. The partner in Cady, Roberts was held to be such a
person by virtue of his own relationship to a director of Curtiss-
Wright 110
Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,163
at 80,521.
113 See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. also The Public
Interest in Our Securities Markets, Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC,
before the Institutional Trading Conference, in New York City, June 17, 1971, SEC
News Release (June 17, 1971); Responsibilities and Liabilities in Corporate Life, Address
by William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, before the Conference Board, in New York
City, November 28, 1971, SEC News Release (Nov. 28, 1971).
114 See notes 36-37 supra.
115
 40 S.E.C. at 912.
115 See text accompanying notes 35-41, supra.
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The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur affirmed the principles
established by the SEC in Cady, Roberts. The judges unanimously
agreed that the concept of an insider is not limited to officers, directors
and major stockholders of issuers who are subject to Section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act."7 The majority evidently adopted the view that the
coverage of Rule 10b-5 extends to any person who possesses material,
nonpublic information acquired as a result of some direct or indirect
special relationship which gives that person access to a corporate
source not enjoyed by other investors.'"
In its Investors Management opinion, the SEC provides a test
which extends the duty to disclose, or refrain from dealing, beyond
the limits indicated in Cady, Roberts: "the tippee, whether he receives
the information directly or indirectly, [must] know or have reason to
know that it was obtained improperly by selective revelation or other-
wise . . . .""° The SEC noted that it specifically intends to impose
responsibility regardless of whether the material, nonpublic information
originated with a corporate insider or an access insider, such as a pro-
spective underwriter. 120 Such a formulation substitutes mere "reason to
117 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). See note 41 supra. The majority opinion states
that;
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by this Rule, pre-
cluded from so unfairly dealing [with the investing public], but the Rule is also
applicable to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an
"insider" within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act.
401 F.2d at 848. This is necessarily a unanimous holding since all the judges affirmed the
district court's holding that Clayton, who was only an employee, had violated the
Rule.
118 The majority opinion indicates that
[t]he essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the
securities of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone" may not take "advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public [citation
omitted].
Id. The court of appeals at one point stated that "anyone in possession of material inside
information" has a duty of disclosure under Rule 1013-5. Id. (emphasis added). Subse-
quently, however, the court commented that the congressional concern in this area was
"unequal access to knowledge," id. at 852 (emphasis added), which indicates affirmation
of the Cady, Roberts limitations,
119 Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec L. Rep.
11 78,163 at 80,519. The Commission then explained:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public cor-
porate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate
source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to other investors,
thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the'
purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.
Id. Commissioner Smith, concurring in the result, disagreed with the Commission's state-
ment as embodying "a concept—too vague for me to apply with any consistency—of
relative informational advantages in the marketplace." Id. at 80,523.
120 The SEC's explanation of this element of the SEC test is as follows:
Our formulation would clearly attach responsibility in a situation where the
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know" that the information originated from a "corporate source" for
the "relationship giving access" test which the SEC first adopted.
Although the new SEC standard does not impose responsibility on the
investor who discovers material nonpublic information "by general
observation or analysis," 12 " it could impose responsibility in every
other possible situation. Thus, the test indicated in Investors Manage-
ment would greatly enlarge the number of situations in which a person
could be held liable.
The SEC's explanation that responsibility may arise "where
persons innocently come into possession"122 of material, nonpublic in-
formation confirms that it no longer intends to apply the "special rela-
tionship" test of Cady, Roberts. Suppose that a financial analyst is in-
discreetly given important nonpublic information at a cocktail party
by one who has had "one too many" but who has no known connection
with the issuer involved. Although there appears to be no justification
for imposing a duty of disclosure on the analyst who "innocently came
into possession" of the information,'" the SEC might try to do so on
the grounds that it gives him an advantage over other investors and
that he has "reason to know that it . . . had been obtained by selective
revelation or otherwise."'"
The SEC's formulation could also be interpreted as implying that
the inside information need not originate with the corporation whose
securities are involved. If, as the opinion states at one point, the "rela-
tionship" element of Cady, Roberts is actually one which refers to the
superior investment position obtained by a person having material,
nonpublic information, it could follow that the duty to disclose arises
regardless of the source.'" If this is the case, it is possible that an in-
recipient knew or had reason to know the information was obtained by industrial
espionage, commercial bribery or the like. We also consider that there would be
potential responsibility, depending on an evaluation of the specific facts and
circumstances, where persons innocently come into possession of and then use
information which they have reason to know is intended to be confidential.
Id. at 80,519 n.18.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 It does not appear that the court of appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur intended to
limit the basis of the duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 to situations involving a fiduciary
duty. A broader basis is suggested by the court's comments that the 1934 Act was
designed "to insure fairness in securities transactions generally," 401 F.2d at 848, and that
"[Ole core of Rule 10h-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities trans-
actions . [and] be subject to identical market risks. . . 1" Id. at 851-52. Nevertheless,
there is no indication that the court intends to define the class of persons subject to the
duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 in a manner broader than that established in Cady,
Roberts. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
124 Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
78,163 at 80,519 (emphasis added).
125 Some slight indication that the SEC may have reserved the right to act in this
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vestor could become subject to a duty to disclose material, nonpublic
information, such as the impending award of a major contract or
commencement of an important lawsuit or administrative proceeding,
which originates outside of and is unknown to the company whose
securities are being traded. Such an interpretation, however, would be
inconsistent with the principle followed by courts in tender offer situa-
tions that a company and its "friends" secretly acquiring shares prior
to a takeover attempt have no duty to disclose their identity or inten-
tionsain
The SEC in Investors Management evidently has taken a first
step toward the establishment of a broad class of persons subject to the
duty of disclosure under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5--a class which
could encompass significantly more investors than are now covered
under the standard adopted in Cady, Roberts and affirmed in Texas
Gulf Sulphur. With respect to the outer limits, the SEC has stated only
that which was never in doubt: that a person is under no duty to
disclose information "which is obtained by general observation or
analysis."'" But it is unclear whether an investor having no special
relationship or access to a company will be subject to a duty of dis-
closure if he obtains material, nonpublic information not knowing how
it got out of the company, or if he obtains information which is un-
known even to the issuer itself. By using broad language and adopting
vague concepts to describe when a person may become subject to Rule
10b-5, the SEC has contributed to, rather than reduced, the confusion
over who can be held liable as a tippee.
D. A Factor in Investment Decision
The duty imposed by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires that
tippees and insiders disclose material, nonpublic information to others
direction might be found in the SEC's use of the article "a" at one point in its opinion.
The SEC stated that the person in possession of information must have "reason to know
[that it] eminates from a corporate source . . ." Id. at 80,520.
120 Investment companies have been involved in corporate takeovers in a number
of cases where no attempt was made to impose responsibility under Rule 10b-5 for their
purchases of securities of the target company. Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp.
526 (D. Wis. 1969), aff'd and remanded 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Bangor Punta
Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,294 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
In a brief filed by the SEC in the case of Pacific Insurance Company v.
Blot ... the SEC took the position that a party acquiring shares in the open
market prior to a planned tender offer need not inform purchasers of the pro-
spective offer.
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offer (rev. ed. April, 1968)
reprinted in A.B.A. Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Selected Articles
on Federal Securities Law at 830 n.60. For a discussion of the takeover problem see,
Comment, Participation by Mutual Funds in Corporate Takeovers, infra at 1113,
127 Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
II 78,163 at 80,519 n.18.
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or that they not use it themselves.'28 If no causal connection exists
between the information and the investment decision, however, an
investor will not be held liable for transactions made prior to public
dissemination of the information. 129 'On this point, the Hearing Exam-
iner in Investors Management, after rejecting the contentions of a num-
ber of other respondents that their sales were motivated by factors
other than the Merrill Lynch information, found that one adviser to a
large registered investment company had not committed a violation of
Rule iOb-5 because "no use was made of the information."'" The
Examiner based his conclusion on a factual finding that the financial
analyst employed by the adviser refused to disclose to his superiors
the real reason for his adamant sell recommendations. 1e' Although the
majority of the Commissioners accepted the Hearing Examiner's find-
ings and conclusions, they were obviously disturbed by them.
The Commissioners noted:
[I]n future cases we would view as suspect and subject to
close scrutiny a defense that there was no internal communi-
cation of material non-public information and its source by
a member of a broker-dealer firm or other investment orga-
nization Who received it, where a transaction of the kind
indicated by it was effected by his organization immediately
or closely thereafter. A showing of such receipt and transac-
tion prior to the time the information became public should
in itself constitute strong evidence of knowledge by the one
who effected the transaction and by the firm.'"
The majority stated that a sufficient causal connection will be found
whenever the material, nonpublic information is "a factor in the
investment decision . . . 2' 1" The SEC, warning that its test of causa-
tion is intended to be a broad one, declared that whenever someone
who possesses material, nonpublic information about a company en-
gages in advantageous trades in the securities of that company a
128 Id. at 80.521; see also 401 F.2d at 848.
129
 Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 77,832 at 83,971.
tao Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,832 at 83,961.
181 Id. at 83,959-61. The testimony showed that the analyst not only had insisted
that the holding be sold, he had even threatened to resign if his advice was not followed.
Nevertheless, the Hearing Examiner held that no material, nonpublic information had
been used because the person making the investment decision did not know of the
existence of the information in the adviser's organization.
132 Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,163 at 80,522 n.28,
183 Investors Management Co. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,163 at 80,522.
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presumption will arise that such information was a factor in his invest-
ment decision.' As a result, it is unlikely that in the future any •tippee
or insider having inside information who engages in a securities trans-
action prior to public announcement will be able to avoid liability by
denying that the information influenced his decision.
One Commissioner disagreed with the majority's concept of causal
connection. He noted that "[t] he Commission's staff in this case, and
in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf, accepted the burden of proving that
the inside information was the motivating factor, and not just a factor,
in the decision to effect the transaction."'" The Commissioner, deter-
mining that the standard used by the SEC's own staff and adopted by
the Hearing Examiner in his initial decision was not unduly burden-
some, disapproved the adoption of a broader one.
It seems clear that the Hearing Examiner and the Commissioner
properly required that material, nonpublic information be communi-
cated in some manner to the individual responsible for making invest-
ment decisions in order for a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
to occur. It would be unreasonable to penalize an institution effecting
securities, transactions in situations where an employee had possession
of information about the issuer but never disclosed it to anyone, either
directly or indirectly. Such a result would be inconsistent with the
obligation imposed under Rule 10b-5 not to pass on any material,
nonpublic information absent a legitimate corporate purpose.' 8°
It is doubtful, however, whether this requirement will have any
significant value for investment companies in actual situations, for it is
unlikely that an analyst assigned to a particular company can remain
silent when an investment decision is about to be made with respect to
that company's securities. Moreover, if the analyst having inside infor-
mation prepares a report on the company but does not indicate in his
report that his recommendations were based on anything other than
proper information, it still would appear that a violation could be
found. Unless the individual responsible for making the investment
`decision can show that the analyst's report was not a factor in his
'decision, it is unlikely that the SEC or a court would find that the
134
 The SEC stated that:
[W]e are of the opinion that where a transaction of the kind indicated by the
information (e.g., a sale or short sale upon adverse information) is effected by
the recipient prior to its public dissemination, and [sic] inference arises that the
information was such a factor.
Id.
133 Id. at 80,524 (emphasis added).
iss Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942 without notice and opportunity for hearing.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 323 (May 21, 1942). For a description of its informal
origin, see remarks of Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Law, 22 Bus. Lawyer 793, 922 (1967). The Rule has not been revised since its
adoption.
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information on which the report was written was not indirectly a
factor.
CONCLUSION
The development of the law extending the duty of disclosure
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 beyond corporate and access
insiders is not surprising in view of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf
Sulphur. Because the development has been only by interpretation on
a case by case basis, however, there are overly broad areas of current
law in which conduct intended in good faith to be honest may expose
investors and investment companies to substantial liabilities. 187
The SEC and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appear
to differ significantly regarding the elements which form the duty of
disclosure under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S. It is submitted that
in trying to adopt a standard which would establish a relatively high
level of materiality and provide investors with a relatively high degree
of certainty,1376
 the SEC has disregarded the test established by the
court.
137 The majority points out in Texas Gulf Sulphur that: "Even if insiders were in
fact ignorant of the broad scope of the Rule and acted pursuant to a mistaken belief as
to the applicable law such an ignorance does not insulate them from the consequences of
their acts." Id. at 852 n.15, See also Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,163 at 80,522.
157a The Supreme Court, on April 24, 1972, decided an important case under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah vs. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 4448 (Apr. 24, 1972). Although the case did not involve market transactions,
the holding of the Court may well apply to transactions in the securities markets as well
as to person-to-person transactions. The case involved a statute which provided for the
distribution of valuable assets located on the Ute Indian Tribe's Utah reservation between
mixed-blood and full-blood members of the Tribe. As part of the plan, federal supervision
over the Tribe's property was terminated, and a development program to assist full-blood
members of the Tribe was established. In addition, the mixed-bloods were authorized to
organize the Affiliated Ute Citizens (AUC) as an incorporated association which, pursuant
to the plan, would create Ute Development Corporation (UDC) to co-manage, together
with a tribal committee, the Tribe's oil, gas, and mineral rights and unadjudicated or
unliquidated claims against the government.
UDC issued ten shares of its stock to each mixed-blood and made an agreement with
First Security Bank (of Utah) whereby the bank became UDC's stock transferee and held
all stock certificates which had been issued. Under UDC's Articles of Incorporation, a
mixed-blood shareholder was required, during the period involved, to give first refusal
rights to the Tribe members at a price no higher than that in any offer to nonmembers.
The district court found that the bank and two of its employees violated Rule 10b-5 in
connection with sales by mixed-bloods of UDC stock to the two employees and other
persons who were not members of the Tribe. The district court found, inter alia, that they
had violated their duty to make a fair disclosure by failing to inform the mixed-bloods
that they would personally benefit from the sales, as a result of their own purchases and
direct or indirect remuneration received on purchases by others, and that the shares of
UDC were selling for a higher price in a non-Indian market which the employees had
helped to develop and maintain.
The court of appeals reversed this part of the district court's opinion on the ground
that the two employees performed essentially ministerial functions in connection with the
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Moreover, the literal language of Investors Management sug-
gests that the Comrnissioners" 8
 may believe that the class of persons
who can become subject to a duty of disclosure under Rule 1.0b-5
is much broader than the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision and its own
opinion in Cady, Roberts would indicate. The SEC's substitution of
knowledge that information is "non-public and had been obtained
improperly by selective revelation or otherwise" for the requirement
that there be some "special relationship" giving access to inside infor-
mation could mean that the SEC intends to push the coverage of Rule
lOb-5 even beyond the type of tippee involved in the Investors Man-
agement proceeding.
In view of the uncertain state of the law, the advice given by
former Chairman Cohen three months before the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision—that any doubt on whether information can be used for per-
sonal advantage "should be resolved in favor of the investing public
transfer activities and that such conduct is not sufficient to give rise to a duty of disclosure
under Rule 10b-5. 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals. While agreeing that "if the two men and the employer bank had functioned
merely as a transfer agent, there would have been no duty of disclosure," 40 U.S.L.W. at
4456, the Court found that because "[t]he individual defendants, in a distinctive sense,
were market makers, not only for their personal purchases comprising 8 1/3% of the sales,
but for the other sales their activities produced," they did have a duty to disclose ma-
terial facts. Id. With respect to whether material facts were withheld, the court, citing
Chasiris v. Smith, Barney and Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir: 1970), stated that
[t]he sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a position to
gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a higher
price in [the non-Indian] market. . Under the circumstances of this case, in-
volving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a pre-
requisite to recovery. AU that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in
the making of this decision.
Id. at 4456.
The Affiliated Ute Citizens case is important in the development of Rule 10b-5 for a
number of reasons. Adoption by the Supreme Court of the Second Circuit's standard of
materiality presents the SEC with a difficult problem. Although this case can be distin-
guished from Investors Management in that the latter involved tranactions over a
securities exchange, there is no indication that the holding was intended to be limited to
person-to-person transactions. The SEC should now decide whether to modify its po-
sition on materiality or permit investors to be misled by its statement that an investor
will not incur liability unless he possesses a fact likely to have a substantial effect on the
market price of an issuer's stock.
The Supreme Court's decision also can be interpreted as affirming the definition of a
more limited class of potential tippees described in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gull Sulphur.
If the Court believed that "any person" could become subject to a duty to disclose ma-
terial information, regardless of whether any "special relationship" existed, it likely would
not have commented that no duty would have existed had the two men and the bank
functioned merely as a transfer agent. The Affiliated Ute Citizens case also indicates that
the SEC's opinion in Investors Management is inconsistent with the holdings of the courts
and should be clarified.
1" Commissioner Smith disagreed with the majority's discussion in this area, Id.
at 80,523-24. See text accompanying note 102.
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and the markets generally"'"—is equally true today. It is not clear,
however, whether investment companies, in view of their obligations
to their shareholders, can always afford to take that advice when the
alternative is to suffer a loss or forego a gain.'" Moreover, one cannot
expect an investment company and its advisers and analysts to dis-
regard investment opportunities in every case when the question of
responsibility is doubtful. Since the success of investment companies
primarily results from good investment performance, it is more likely
that many will follow a policy of assuming the risk of violations. In
such a world the only thing probable is that the securities law lawyers
are the only persons who will consistently come out ahead.
139
 Disclosure: The SEC and the Press, Address by former Chairman of the SEC,
Manuel F. Cohen, before the Univ. of Connecticut, G.M. Loeb Awards Luncheon, in New
York City, May 21, 1968, at 5.
149
 See Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1342 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Insurance
Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 665 (9th Cir. 1958). Only a little help is provided by the
unsupported statement of the SEC that
[t]here is no basis for the stated concern that a fiduciary who refrains from
acting because he has received what he believes to be restricted information
would be held derelict if it should later develop that the information could in
fact have been acted upon legally. If that belief is reasonable, his non-action
could not be held improper.
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,163 at 80,522.
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